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Attention control describes the human ability to selectively modulate the plethora of
sensory signals and internal thoughts. The neural systems of attention control have
been studied extensively, warranted by the importance of this ability to daily functioning.
Here, we consider an emerging theme in the study of attention control—slow temporal
fluctuations. We posit that these fluctuations are functionally significant, and may reflect
underlying interactions between the neural systems related to attention control. We
explore thought experiments to generate different perspectives on landscapes created
by the interactions between attention control networks and the sources of input to
these control systems. We examine interactions of the fronto-parietal and the default
mode networks in the context of internal cognition, and the noradrenergic modulatory
projections in the context of arousal, and we consider the implications of these
inter-network dynamics on attention states and attention disorders. Through these thought
experiments we highlight the breadth of potential knowledge to be gained from the study
of slow fluctuations in attention control.
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ATTENTION CONTROL AND FLUCTUATIONS
Attention control allows us to ignore distracting information so
that we may focus selectively on information relevant to goal
directed behavior. Copious research has demonstrated that atten-
tion control involves “top-down” signals from association cor-
tices, biasing activity in sensory regions to enhance the magnitude
of attended signals; and evidence is building to show that top-
down processes also suppress the magnitude of ignored signals
(Posner and Dehane, 1994; Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Miller
and Cohen, 2001). Integral to top-down biasing is the fronto-
parietal network (FPN, also referred to as the “executive con-
trol network”) (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Dosenbach et al.,
2006; Fox et al., 2006; Raichle, 2011), a network encompassing
dorsal and medial prefrontal cortices and superior parietal cor-
tices, that acts to distinguish attended from ignored signals (Ruff
and Driver, 2006; Gazzaley et al., 2007; Capotosto et al., 2009)
(Figure 1A, left panel). Recruitment of this system is thought
to occur when multiple sensory signals compete for processing
resources (Braver and Cohen, 2000; Botvinick et al., 2001; Miller
and Cohen, 2001) and/or at the trigger of a salient orienting sig-
nal (e.g., novel or loud sound, such as a fire alarm; Posner and
Petersen, 1990; Posner and Dehane, 1994).
Attention control also appears to be a fluctuating system.
Castellanos et al. (2005) showed that the speed of response in
an attention task increases and decreases over a period of 15 s
(0.068Hz) or so, and that these fluctuations are particularly
pronounced in children with attention deficit hyperactivity dis-
order (ADHD). Monto et al. (2008) showed that the accuracy
in a simple detection task fluctuates in runs of 10–100 s, that
track electrophysiological fluctuations of the same period. The
activity of the FPN also shows fluctuations in this frequency
range (Vincent et al., 2008). These findings indicate that attention
control integrity varies across time, and that this variability has
implications for behavior and disease. In contrast, predominant
models of attention are concerned with what we term “moment-
to-moment attention” (Figure 1A, right panel); they explain how
attention control influences the processing of discrete, primar-
ily external, sensory events by averaging attention signals across
moments—and as such across fluctuations—in time. In the cur-
rent perspective we therefore explore the emerging question, what
are the causes and functional significance of temporal variations in
attention control?
SYSTEMIC AND INPUT SOURCES OF FLUCTUATIONS
If we consider the FPN as a core system that underlies atten-
tion control, then fluctuations of attention control (proportional
to the strength of modulation of the relative strengths of tar-
get and distractor signals, Figure 1A) likely indicate fluctuations
in the efficacy of this system. Sources of these fluctuations may
be classified further as either systemic or input. A systemically-
based fluctuation in efficacy would be defined as a limitation
in FPN functionality occurring when the entire system is tem-
porarily less active, either because of operational characteristics
(e.g., the entire system is activated insufficiently) or because of
negative interactions with other neural systems (e.g., its activ-
ity is suppressed by another system)—with no change to the
inputs. An input-based fluctuation would be defined as a mis-
direction of FPN activity relative to a desired goal, such as when
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FIGURE 1 | In a representative scenario of attention control and its
fluctuations (A), (left panel) activity corresponding to an attended
signal (e.g., visual cortex) is enhanced (red thermometer level is high)
and activity corresponding to an ignored signal (e.g., auditory) is
suppressed, due to control signals from the FPN. The magnitude of
enhancement is quantified by comparing activity for the target stimulus
when it is attended relative to when it is ignored (right panel). This can be
conceived as an average index of “moment-to-moment” attention, an
approach that ignores any underlying fluctuations in the attended signal
amplitude (blue and red dots) that may be related to functionally significant
variations in attention control. Potential sources of such fluctuations are
shown below (B), and can be system-based (i) and input-based (ii). In the
case of systemic sources a decrease in FPN activity could arise by (i), the
antagonistic influence of another network (left; DMN–default mode
network) or decreased modulatory input (right; LC–locus coeruleus
noradrenergic inputs) that decrease activity in FPN, leading to an
attenuation of control over sensory processing regions, and therefore
lower indices of control as measured in the target processing region (red
thermometer level is low). In the case of input-based fluctuations, FPN
activity level does not change but is redirected to a different processing
input (ii). In this example attention is oriented toward an internal input
(e.g., a memory, indicated by ∗ ), resulting in a decrease in responses to
other inputs—including other internal inputs (e.g., planning dinner) and the
external target (visual) inputs. The identity of cortical regions that process
internal inputs is unknown (?), as are the interactions of such regions with
higher-order networks (e.g., DAN/DMN). We posit here one possibility, that
the input cortices and higher-order networks responsible for their
processing will be positively correlated in their relationship with FPN. In
the example here, the involuntary capture of attention by an internal input
leads to positive correlations between DMN and FPN.
attention control is rerouted by distracting signals, be they exter-
nal signals or, as we consider here, internal thoughts—without
a change in FPN activation. Therefore, a key to understand-
ing the fluctuations in efficacy of attention control is knowledge
of the conditions for, and products of, the interactions of FPN
with other neural systems and inputs. We consider here two such
candidates, arousal and internal cognition.
THE CASE OF AROUSAL
The idea of a systemic fluctuation of FPN is demonstrated readily
in the effect that chemical neuromodulators have on its efficacy.
All four of the primary neuromodulators, the catecholamines
(dopamine and noradrenaline), acetylcholine and serotonin, have
been shown to affect attention (Foote and Morrison, 1987; Coull,
1998; Briand et al., 2007; Rokem et al., 2010). For brevity we
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focus on the example of the noradrenergic (NE) system (for a
comprehensive review see Moore and Bloom, 1979; Foote et al.,
1983; Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003), often referred to as the
LC-NE system because all of its cortical projections arise from
a single nucleus in the brainstem, the locus coeruleus (LC). The
LC-NE system is of interest because, being part of the reticular
activating system (Moruzzi andMagoun, 1949), historically it has
been associated with arousal (Berridge and Waterhouse, 2003).
In turn, arousal is a prerequisite for attention. Indeed decreased
firing of LC neurons is correlated both with drowsiness (Roussel
et al., 1967; Aston-Jones and Bloom, 1981) and with poor atten-
tional performance (Mason and Iversen, 1978; Aston-Jones et al.,
1999). Excess LC firing, like excess arousal, is also detrimental to
performance (Aston-Jones et al., 1999).
How do these observations contribute to systemic fluctuations
of FPN? The LC-NE system has diffuse projections across cortex,
with terminals that include the FPN (Moore and Bloom, 1979).
The effect of NE, specifically, is to decrease spontaneous firing and
increase the evoked response (Foote et al., 1975), interpreted as
an increase in fidelity and gain of the neuronal response (Aston-
Jones and Cohen, 2005). The LC-NE system therefore influences
the responsivity of FPN to inputs (as well as of other systems)
when attention control is required. This suggests that the LC-NE
system could contribute to fluctuations of attention control when
the LC-NE system is either under- or overactive, translating into
a weaker or stronger response of the FPN as an entire system,
given no change in the inputs (Aston-Jones and Cohen, 2005;
for a complementary interpretation see Corbetta and Shulman,
2002; Corbetta et al., 2008). This is therefore a systemic not an
input fluctuation of attention control. A weaker response of the
FPN would translate into weaker modulatory control over tar-
get regions, meaning less target enhancement and less distractor
suppression (Figure 1B-i, right panel).
THE CASE OF INTERNAL COGNITION
A very different example of a seemingly systemic fluctuation
is internal cognition, which refers to thinking; it encompasses
mind wandering, self-evaluation, problem solving and active
remembering (Giambra, 1995; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006;
McVay and Kane, 2009, 2010; Schooler et al., 2011; Christoff,
2012; Smallwood, 2012), processes that have been associated
with the activation of a group of functionally connected regions
that include medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex,
restrosplenial cortex, as well as medial temporal and lateral infe-
rior parietal cortices (Binder et al., 1999; Gusnard et al., 2001;
Johnson et al., 2002; Gordon et al., 2007; Mason et al., 2007;
Buckner et al., 2008; Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2011). Together these regions comprise
the so-called default mode network (DMN) (Shulman et al., 1997;
Mazoyer et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 2008).
Internal cognition is of particular interest because thinking
can, in principle, interfere with attention control over external
inputs both through systemic and input pathways. As a sys-
temic influence thinking can be considered a competitor to FPN
activity (Figure 1B-i, left panel). This hypothesis is supported
by early findings showing that FPN activity is correlated nega-
tively with that of the DMN (Fox et al., 2005; Fox and Raichle,
2007). In turn, DMN activity is correlated positively with lapses
of external attention (Weissman et al., 2006), reflecting moments
when participants are off-task (Buckner et al., 2008; Andrews-
Hanna, 2012) and have decreased control over external signals
(Weissman et al., 2009; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood et al.,
2012). Accordingly, fluctuations of attention control could be
interpreted as instances during which DMN activation suppresses
activity in the FPN and attention control is disrupted by inter-
nal cognition, a systemic fluctuation of attention in reference to
external signals.
A model based on antagonistic interaction between FPN and
DMN, while a useful starting point, is likely an oversimplifica-
tion of the underlying dynamics. It assumes that internal control
and external control are independent, antagonistic systems, which
leads to the difficult question: “Who” determines which type
of control is “on” at any given time? Plausibly, the FPN and
DMN interact within a negative feedback circuit (where each
suppresses the other), and their individual engagement is deter-
mined by the strength of their relative inputs. This does not seem
consistent with our ability to quickly switch between internal
and external cognition—with no change in inputs. Alternatively,
some other system determines whether external attention control
or internal cognition is engaged (Sridharan et al., 2008; Leech
et al., 2012). A more parsimonious interpretation is that FPN is
that other system. Namely, DMN activity can be thought of as
another input into FPN that is suppressed when attention is ori-
ented externally—resulting in an apparent negative correlation
between the two systems. The activation of DMN while attempt-
ing to attend to external signals would then be thought of as an
input-based source of fluctuation (Figure 1B-ii).
Perhaps most telling with regard to this notion is the observa-
tion that in some circumstances the DMN and FPN are correlated
positively (Christoff et al., 2009; Spreng et al., 2010; Smallwood
et al., 2012; Spreng et al., 2013), arguing against a strictly antago-
nistic relationship. In these studies, the authors proposed that the
positive coupling between FPN and DMN was interpreted more
appropriately as attention control working in the service of inter-
nal cognition. For instance Spreng et al. (2010, 2013) reported a
positive correlation between FPN and DMN during retrieval of
autobiographical memories, but not when participants engaged
in a visuospatial task. This may be interpreted as attention control
being oriented toward memory retrieval, biasing which internal
signals (corresponding to memories) were to be retrieved and
which were to be ignored.
These observations are consistent with the existence of a sin-
gle attention control system, the FPN, which can be oriented
to process internal or external sources of input (Figure 1B-ii).
Moreover, these sources of input may correspond to other poten-
tial control systems – such as the DMN. Coincidently, during a
visuospatial task, Spreng et al. (2010, 2013) found that the FPN
was no longer coupled with the DMN, but was instead correlated
positively with activities in frontal eye fields and inferior pari-
etal sulci, which comprise the dorsal attention network (DAN),
a specialized control system involved in visuospatial attention.
From this perspective, internal cognition can lead to fluctuations
of attention control by reorienting FPN away from systems con-
trolling external inputs (e.g., interaction with DAN to process
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visuospatial information) and toward systems controlling inter-
nal inputs (e.g., interaction with DMN in the service of memory
retrieval). One hypothesis that arises here is that such orienting of
the FPN would be expected to suppress external signals in general
(along with inappropriate internal signals such as false memories
in the autobiographical retrieval example). Direct support for this
idea has been reported: Mind wandering—awell-known example
of an attention lapse—is associated with decreased processing of
both attended and ignored external signals (Weissman et al., 2006;
Smallwood et al., 2008; Barron et al., 2011; Kam et al., 2011),
a phenomenon referred to recently as “perceptual decoupling”
(Smallwood et al., 2007; Schooler et al., 2011).
A LANDSCAPE OF ATTENTION CONTROL AND
OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS
The notion that multiple influences can modify the behavior of
the FPN implies that attention control can take on multiple states
that are determined by the context of its inputs and systemic influ-
ences, or more simply, by its system interactions. For instance,
if we take the above examples of attention control inputs (inter-
nal/external) and activation (low/high arousal) and explore the
product of their interactions along two axes, a landscape of atten-
tion control states emerges (Figure 2). Following the orientation
axis, we see that attention control can be oriented internally or
externally. We show no variability in orientation, acknowledging
that it is categorical. Following the horizontal arousal axis, we see
that attention control efficacy varies with arousal level with an
optimum in the middle—reflecting the Yerkes-Dodson relation-
ship exemplified by this system (Aston-Jones et al., 1999). Hence
most efficacious attention states occur at the peak of this func-
tion, though the orientation can vary (e.g., focus can be directed
internally such as when problem solving, or externally such as
when reading a book), whereas in the extremes of the arousal
axis, attention lapses occur. Scanning the resulting landscape, two
important observations arise.
The first is that attention lapses can take on multiple flavors.
In this analysis we observe four domains, produced by crossing
arousal states with orientation of attention. If arousal is high, we
predict that FPN will be excessively responsive to all stimuli and
will therefore fail in discriminating between relevant and irrel-
evant inputs. If attention were oriented externally, this may be
manifest as oversensitivity to external stimuli, whereas if attention
were oriented internally, it might translate into racing thoughts
(perhaps rumination). If however arousal is low, we predict that
the FPN response will be sluggish, resulting in reduced responsiv-
ity to stimuli. Again discrimination between relevant and irrel-
evant stimuli would be compromised. In this case, if attention
were oriented externally, we would expect behaviors to be driven
by the most salient or most automatic responses (“bottom-up”)
since minimal control is applied to inputs. Similarly if atten-
tion were oriented internally, we would expect the presence of
mind wandering, in which internal cognition drifts from one
topic to another. This is also the state in which externally ori-
ented attention would be vulnerable to drifting to internal content
and, similarly, internal orientation could drift to external content.
Note that in all four states the outward symptom would be poor
attention to the task at hand, but for very different reasons.
FIGURE 2 | By intersecting arousal and input orientation, we observe
six states of attention control: focus directed internally (e.g., problem
solving) or externally (e.g., reading a book), and four classes of deficits
of attention control. The region of maximal attention performance lies
along the length of the orientation axis, where it intersects the midpoint of
the arousal axis. At this point is the peak of the proposed arousal-attention
function, described by the Yerkes-Dodson curve, when attention control
efficacy is maximal. The proposed effect of LC-NE on FPN neural response
is thought to result in a sensitized response when arousal is high and a
sluggish response when arousal is low. The interpretation of these
extremes in terms of attention deficits varies with the orientation of
attention control. High arousal is interpreted as over-activity of the FPN,
which could produce racing thoughts or rumination when attention is
oriented internally (bottom-right), and stimulus sensitivity when attention is
oriented externally (top-right). Low arousal is interpreted as under-activity of
the FPN, which would result in automated, “bottom-up,” responses. For
internally oriented attention this may be analogous to mind wandering
(bottom-left). For externally oriented attention (top-left) this may be
analogous to attention responses that are based on prepotency of stimuli
(e.g., tendency to read words rather than name ink color in the Stroop task)
or salience (e.g., attention capture).
This perspective raises some questions regarding attention
control mechanisms, especially with regard to internal cognition.
The present synthesis implies that internal cognition is subject
to the same rules of attention control that apply to external
inputs: enhancement of relevant information and suppression
of irrelevant information. Accordingly, distractions within inter-
nal cognition ought to be manifest much like those for external
signals. As an example, consider the case where you attempt to
meditate, but instead drift into thinking about work. Or imag-
ine that you are trying to retrieve the name of a high-school
friend (e.g., “Jenny”), but your memory keeps drifting to your
colleague who has similar sounding last name (e.g., “Jensen”).
In both cases, a potent unrelated thought captures your atten-
tion in the internal modality—much like when a loud sound
captures your attention in the external modality. Therefore rel-
evant and irrelevant signals may be defined for internal cog-
nition much like external signals such as sights and sounds,
and a correct response of the system would be for the FPN
to suppress those irrelevant work thoughts, or the competing
memory.
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What does it mean for FPN to suppress an internal thought?
Can thoughts be conceived as isomorphic with levels of cortical
activity, much like sounds and sights are isomorphic with levels
of activity in auditory and visual cortices? If so, what are these
cortical regions or networks that would be modulated? Would
the structure of internal thought representations require an addi-
tional control system that interacts with the FPN?More generally,
how would we measure lapses that occur within the internal
modality? While certain aspects of attention control may be pre-
served between internal and external modalities, it is possible that
asymmetries exist. Furthermore, while we describe a landscape of
attentional states, we have not addressed how transitions occur
between these states. How do the observed fluctuations in net-
work activity and in behavioral performance relate to transitions
in attentional states? For example, when FPN activity is low does
this create a lower barrier for attention to wander or be captured?
These are important questions that beg further investigation.
Our second, and related, observation is that current models of
attention control are based largely on the study of externally ori-
ented attention. Accordingly, investigations of attention control
impairments are restricted largely to the upper half of Figure 2,
more precisely to the upper left. Interestingly, while distractibility
has been ascribed to a failure of the attention control network,
the cause is not transparent. While it is certainly likely that in
some disorders the FPN is impaired, in other instances an appar-
ent dysfunction of FPN may be accounted for by low arousal
decreasing activation of a normally functioning FPN. The impli-
cation of this proposition is that apparent dysfunctions of FPN
may arise through multiple mechanisms. An interesting test case
in this regard is ADHD. Key symptoms of this disorder have
been impairments of working memory and response inhibition
(Barkley, 1997; Tannock, 1998), leading to the inference that
prefrontal cortex function, which subsumes core nodes of the
FPN, is dysfunctional (Castellanos and Tannock, 2002; Arnsten,
2006; Casey and Riddle, 2012). Yet, the disorder also has been
associated with an impairment of arousal, possibly due to an
underlying noradrenergic disorder (van der Meere and Sergeant,
1988; McCracken, 1991; Biederman and Spencer, 1999).
Several questions arises: are the apparent attention control
symptoms mediated, at least in part, by an underlying deficit in
arousal and, therefore, the sustaining or engaging of attention
control (Huang-Pollock and Nigg, 2003; Huang-Pollock et al.,
2005; Castellanos et al., 2006; Friedman-Hill et al., 2010)? Are
the fluctuations in attention control within an individual related
to interactions of FPN with the LC-NE system? For instance,
the fluctuations of attention control observed by Castellanos
et al. (2005), more pronounced in children with ADHD, had a
period of approximately 15 s. Is this frequency correlated with the
fluctuations of the LC-NE system in this group? Is the amplifica-
tion of these fluctuations related to an aberration in the cellular
properties of the neuromodulatory projections?
CONCLUSION
Our objective in this perspective is to highlight the signifi-
cance of known fluctuations of attention control. We suggest
that sources of these fluctuations consist of two categories, sys-
temic and input, and that may they be thought of as interactions
between FPN and other neural systems. We have presented a
possible landscape of attention control that may result from
the interactions of these systems. Recognizing that this demon-
stration is incomplete—inevitably other neuromodulators, other
networks and associated system interactions are involved—we
present this short perspective to highlight the increasing empha-
sis on and exciting research that has emerged in describing the
brain in terms of network interactions. We believe that under-
standing of these interactions in the context of attention control
fluctuations is imminent and will lead to an improved char-
acterization of the dynamics of attention control and of its
impairments.
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